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THE PRINCE, THE SHAYKH - AND THE LAWYER
Abdulaziz H. Al Fahad*
Two stories, one a well-known historical event, the other a personal
anecdote, should succinctly illustrate the position of the various legal
actors in Saudi Arabia and the extent of their power. The two stories
should also give a flavor of the powerful clash between "tradition" and
"modernity" currently gripping Saudi society.
The first is that of the famous jurist and eponymous founder of
Wahhabism, shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792), who,
after failing to gain the unqualified commitment of some Arabian
princes for his reforms, moved to Dir'iyyah, a hamlet in Najd, as central
Arabia is known. Its ruler, Muhanunad ibn Saud, founder of the Saudi
dynasty, rushed to welcome the distinguished visitor. The shaykh asked
for his support in reforming the errant Arabians and returning them to
the fold of pristine Islam. The exchange that followed is revealing.
The shaykh asked for the prince's support to spread the reform by
the might of his sword, predicting that once the campaign was launched,
the prince would set up a wide realm and achieve supremacy over all of
Arabia. The Saudi prince agreed to begin campaigns but asked for
assurance that the shaykh would not later abandon him for the
sponsorship of other Arabian princes. Upon receiving proper assurances,
he agreed to abide by the true edicts of Islam, but asked for an
exemption with regard to taxation, as he had a custom of regularly
collecting extra-canonical taxes, the legally (i.e., religiously) sanctioned
levy being inadequate to support him. The shaykh politely declined this
request, declaring that if the prince would simply follow the law of God,
the shariah, he "would make up for the losses many fold." The prince
acceded, thus cementing a truly impressive bargain. The rest is history.
The other extreme in the status of legal actors in Saudi Arabia is
illustrated by the following exchange I had with a friendly judge a few
years ago as we were informally chatting about a few issues, including
the lamentable status of lawyers in the country. He told me that for a
while (and as behooves a Muslim jurist) he had had strong reservations
about continuing as a judge, fearing that his inevitable mistakes in
applying the shariah might come to haunt him on the day of judgment.
He thought that resigning his judgeship and practicing as a lawyer might
be the answer - until he was disabused of that notion. He was presiding
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over a trial in which the defendant was being represented by an
apparently articulate and persuasive lawyer and the plaintiff was
representing himself. The plaintiff soon became exasperated, slammed
his fist on the table and requested that the judge grant him a continuance
so that he might look for "a dog to bark" for him, i.e., a lawyer. After
witnessing that scene, the judge told me, he gave up any notion of
becoming a lawyer.1
Between these extremes, a jurist founding a state and a lawyer
performing his canine functions, other legal actors have occupied varied
social positions, many fairly exalted. The functions and powers of these
actors have, of course, been evolving, especially over the last half
century. From essentially sharing the top of the social pyramid for much
of modem Arabian history, in the capacity of jurists, theologians,
traditionists, judges and preachers, they have gradually undergone a
significant differentiation in role, status, as well as power. All of these
functions ultimately derive from the study of the religious sciences of
Islam and have evolved in the course of Islamic history. As early as the
death of the Prophet in 632, a struggle immediately ensued over his
"inheritance." Slowly but clearly, a distinct group emerged, the ulama,
or scholars of religion, especially the law (the shari'ah), whose training
(and piety) lent them the ability to interpret the law authoritatively. The
highest ranks were reserved for the scholars of religion proper, whether
theologians, traditionists or jurists. The conflict that evolved was over
whether the proper heir to the Prophet's legacy was the caliph and
politicians in general, or the ulama. The most concrete manifestation of
the struggle occurred in the third Islamic century (9th century of the
Common Era), during the famous mihna or inquisition of the leading
traditionist of his time, Ahmad ibn Hanbal. The immediate focus of the
inquisition is fairly abstruse, concerning the Quran, which, while
acknowledged by all to be the literal word of God as revealed through
the Prophet, still engendered debate as to its created or pre-eternal
nature. After a long struggle, involving imprisonment and torture of
those jurists who declined to support the position of the caliph
concerning the "created" nature of the Quran, and after the death of
three caliphs, Ibn Hanbal was released and the "state" more or less gave
up any pretense to authority to interpret law, and religion in general.
Many scholars consider this struggle to be a landmark in the evolution
of Islam and the Muslim polity. Henceforth, the role of the ulama as the
Bear in mind that the Arab dog is far inferior in status to its western counterpart.
The former has none of the charming qualities of the latter, and is nothing more than a
vulture that happens to bark.
2 The caliph is the supreme leader of the Muslim community, the secular and
religious head of the Muslim polity. This position lasted from the death of the Prophet
Muhammad until the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in the 1920s.
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guardians and interpreters of God's law was sanctified and beyond
dispute.3 While never equal to the caliph or the successor princes, the
ulama held a position of high esteem, many powers. Through their
control of institutions of learning, many of the religious endowments
and the constant needs of the princes for their services as judges,
advisors, or grantors of legitimacy, they were second in rank to the
princes and their military leaders, but arguably more prestigious.
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab was the product of such tradition,
although he did not adhere to one of the tenets of Sunni Islam in
renouncing political quietism and embarking on a campaign to impose
the shari'ah (and create a state in the process), by force if necessary.
After receiving a traditional Islamic education, including travel
to centers of learning in Arabia and Iraq, he returned to his birthplace in
central Arabia where he attempted to persuade the ruler of the largest
town in the area to support his reforms and to impose Islamic law, a task
at which his success was only temporary. Because of the politics of the
times, he was expelled and found himself a refugee in Dir'iyyah where
he sealed his deal with Ibn Saud. Though the career and personality of
Ibn Abd al Wahhab are fascinating, only a few salient points need to be
mentioned here. First, as a scholar essentially espousing a revolution, he
still chose to restrict his role to that of a jurist, never evincing the wish4
to rule himself or keep it in his family. He, however, still retained
considerable influence, including control over public treasury, biat al
mal. When Muhammad ibn Saud grew old, the jurist designated the
former's son as heir apparent. This compact was to inform the evolution
of Saudi polity to this day. Succession to the throne is predicated on
blood ties; succession within the ulama hierarchy requires learning only.
In accordance with this logic, the house of Saud maintained its (more or
less continuous) control over the throne, but the shaykh's descendants,
the Al Shaykh, had to compete with other learned individuals in the
scholarly community. In fact, the membership of the ulama was wide
open to any individual of learning, and there were probably as many if
3 The inquisition was resolved by the release of the jailed jurist and the defeat of his
opponents. It became the standard practice in the Muslim community to grant the jurists
and only the jurists the role of interpreters of the scripture and the law.
4 It would be fascinating to compare Ibn Abd al Wahhab's career to other (Muslim)
religious reformers. While a difficult task, we know of at least a few cases where jurists
launched reform crusades. Five cases are relevant. The first two, both in North Africa,
that of the Almoravid's and Almohad's, took place in the 1 1 th through 13th centuries. The
former was a movement initiated and sustained by tribal leaders who themselves sought
the participation of the jurist. Almohad's was launched by a theologian and jurist who
remained in control and happened to die without issue. The other three more modem
movements, the Sanusiya of Libya, The Mahdiyya of Sudan, and Idrisiyyah of Asir
(southwest Saudi Arabia), resulted in the jurist's family inheriting political control.
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not more non-Al Shaykh jurists5 at the top of the ulama hierarchy. More
strikingly, the age-honored Arabian barriers of genealogy6 were
completely absent, and many of the top ranking ulama came from non-
genealogically pure backgrounds, including the former grand mufti7 of
Saudi Arabia (who died last summer). This extraordinary avenue to
overcoming barriers was not merely restricted to the social realm, but
actually extended to physical handicaps, especially blindness (common
in Arabia until recent times).8 Though difficult to quantify, it could be
safely surmised that there were as many blind as non-blind members of
the ulama until very recently (the current grand mufti is blind).
Whatever its composition, the community always served as an
indispensable part of the governing elite, at times facilitating, at times
thwarting the task of the politicians. The ulama became an entrenched
group within the state (such as it was) and provided its intellectual elite,
its apologists, its judges, its preachers. The history of the military
campaigns of the Wahhabi movement is reasonably documented, but the
efforts of those ideologues, who more than anyone else managed to
subvert the old ways of Arabia and pave the way for the new political
order, are still inadequately understood.
The Wahhabi ulama, in conjunction with military campaigns,
launched their own wars against opponents including the anti-Wahhabi
ulama (whether local or otherwise), who objected mostly to their
sanction of the use of force to bring the misguided to the fold through
the application of the powerful concept of "command of virtue and
prevention of vice." In charge of the ideological defense of the realm,
the Wahhabi ulama pursued a relentless campaign against the prevalent,
errant ways: laxity in performing religious duties and the application of
the shari'ah as well as the adoption of many prohibited bid'as,
innovations. They attacked (and ultimately forced into exile9) their Najdi
5 Non-Al Shaykh jurists do not belong to the Al Shaykh family, which by definition
includes the patrilineal descendents of the Shaykh.
6 Arabians classify themselves according to whether they are descended
from "pure" Arabian tribes. While the overwhelming majority of the population
is so recognized, a large minority, who may have lost track of their own pure
descent or were immigrants or descendants of slaves, are not.
7 A mufti, jurisconsult, is a scholar who has attained enough learning to be able to
render religious and legal answers or rulings to questions submitted to him by individual
Muslims or the state; the answer/ruling is the fatwa. A mufti is, but not always,
appointed by the state.
8 Until recently, blindness was widespread due to the incidence of smallpox and
other diseases.
9 We know of at least one instance when the Wabhabi ulama appear to have
sanctioned the execution of a dissenting scholar, Ibn Gharib, in the late 18th century. The
events surrounding his death are murky, especially since the offense of which he is
310 [Vol.32:307
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opponents, first to eastern Arabia and later to Iraq, until Najd became
their exclusive domain. They also sustained powerful polemics against
other opponents outside of Najd-such as the ulama of Hijaz and various
Ottoman provinces, especially Iraq and Syria. Their most effective fight
was arguably the subversion of the nomadic order, always a thorn in the
side of any aspiring polity seeking to impose central authority in
Arabia.1 ° By deploying the law of God against the nomadic tribes (all of
whom were nominally Muslim), their way of life and their own
"judges,"'1 by questioning the legality of their possessions (some if not
most of which were acquired through raids), they managed to seriously
weaken the legitimacy of the nomadic order and enlist various tribes as
soldiers in the cause of the true religion.
In all these campaigns, the Wahhabi scholars essentially adhered to
the Hanbali school of Islamic law. On the theological (i.e., ideological)
level, the Wahhabis followed a strict Hanbali theology, as interpreted by
the great jurist Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) and his disciples. Their enemies,
local or otherwise, were those who adhered to other theological schools,
such as Ashari speculative theology and antinomian sufism. Both were
eventually defeated by the Wahhabis and a puritanical Islam was
imposed on the population. Such was the power of those ideologues.
Until the second half of this century, the ulama simply
functioned in the traditional ways as muftis, providing citizens with
religious rulings, or the prince with proper edicts for state
administration. Some scholars were appointed as judges in towns, and
the lesser educated were sent to preach among nomads and settled alike.
In an essentially illiterate society, they were the learned class, the
authors of the majority of the surviving literature of the era. Despite
their erudition, the organization of the judicial apparatus was skeletal
and no formal rules, except for the ancient texts, existed. Judgments
were rarely written and no appeals existed beyond the customary
petition to the prince.
accused (his edict that booty taken from non-Wahhabi Muslims could not be treated as
that taken from non-Muslims) does not appear to be sufficient ground to "legalize" his
blood. The other well-known example, the execution of the scholar Ibn 'Amr early this
century, does not appear to have been endorsed by afatwa (ruling upon a point of belief,
practice or law rendered by a qualified "jurisconsult," i.e., the mufti) and seems to be
firmly rooted in politics-he supported the competing house of Al Rashid.
10 The nomads and the settlers were both Muslims, which the purists found not
acceptably Islamic enough.
11 Each Arabian nomadic clan had its own 'arifah or judge who settled disputes
according to customary Bedouin laws. Those "laws" were handed down through the
centuries and appear to have been sufficient for the nomadic communities to maintain a
semblance of order, such as it was. One interesting aspect of this practice was the
application of stare decisis!
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With the consolidation of the modem (third) Saudi state, which in
1999 celebrated its centennial, the pressures of modernity were felt and
a slow evolution took hold, gradually transforming the ulama and the
judiciary.
Courts were divided into more specialized tribunals, such as general
and summary courts. Appeals were instituted, first to the grand mufti of
the country and later into a more elaborate system, including a supreme
court. Despite this impressive evolution, the demands of modernization
created serious tensions among the ulama and between them and the
state. While the ulama have historically been one of the pillars of the
formation and maintenance of the state, they also presented serious
challenges to the introduction of modem reforms, be they legal, social,
technological or educational.
Although many reforms were successfully introduced over their
objections, it is a testimony to their extraordinary power that this group
has served and still serves as a powerful check on an otherwise
autocratic system of governance.
Examples of ulama resistance are abundant. In addition to their
function as upholders and interpreters of the law, they also took their
role as protectors of the common man seriously. As in other traditional
Islamic societies, taxes constituted the battleground. (Recall Ibn Abd al
Wahhab's refusal to endorse Ibn Saud's extra-canonical taxes.) Early this
century, the battleground was the introduction of customs duties over
imports, which the ulama fought but eventually lost, an indication of
relatively declining power.
Among modem innovations, the learned ulama12 were originally
uneasy with the introduction of the telegraph, holding (under prodding
by the late King Abdulaziz) that they did not know enough to issue a
ruling, while the less qualified suspected the invention as an instrument
of the devil and fought it, despite the tremendous advantage it presented
in allowing leaders to control the huge country. 13 Radio was opposed by
12 It is incorrect to speak of the ulama as one undifferentiated group. Among them
always existed conservatives and moderates, those who were willing to accommodate the
prince and modernity and those who refused. To examine these distinctions is beyond the
scope of this paper.
13 There is a legend circulating in history books about the introduction of the
telegraph. It is said that when King Abd al Aziz (d. 1953) decided to introduce the
wireless, in order to overcome the objections of the ulama and prove that the device was
human-made and not an instrument of the devil, he demonstrated its acceptability by
having the Quran transmitted, thus proving that no devil was involved, as he would have
prevented the Quran to go through as religious beliefs dictate. The true story is rather
that the late king was too astute to fall for this. When the idea was suggested, he refused
to allow the demonstration, noting that if during transmission, the telegraph happened to
fail, as is the wont of these devices, it would be impossible to overcome the ulama's
resistance in the foreseeable future
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many ulama, some to this day, proclaiming its impermissibility, not by
and of itself, but as a vehicle for impermissible things. Thus legitimate
religious concerns came to the fore, such as the airing of music.
Likewise, television was fought,14 with one religious prince killed
during a related altercation, 15 and was only imposed by state fiat.16 This
proclivity is still alive and well in the most recent battle over the legality
of satellite dishes, where the ulama are generally united in their
hostility. Relatedly, the ulama have been adamantly opposed to still
pictures, not allowing the state to use or require them of citizens until
recently (but not for women). Interestingly, the recent introduction of
internet service in the country did not elicit much controversy, a sign of
growing sophistication with respect to modem inventions and probably
in recognition that as a medium it could lend itself, just like radio and
TV, to becoming a means for spreading the Islamic message.
17
While the preceding examples give the impression that the anti-
modernity elements of the ulama have been on the losing end of the
struggle, that conclusion would certainly be unjustified. For, as typical
of conservative forces in any society, initial hostility towards
introduction of modem devices soon turns to acceptance, use, and
control, once the advantages of the new technology become apparent.
The powerful committees now monitoring state radio and television
broadcasts are a case in point. Indeed, many conservative ulama have
concluded that use of the new media was the best way to convey the
message and promote conformity to God's laws. Hence there is an
inordinate presence of religious matters in the Saudi media.
In addition to technology, modernity also confronted the ulama
through education. Initially, they fought to maintain the old system both
in style and content, rejecting "secular" education which had to be
introduced piecemeal and sometimes by stealth, with most modem
schools starting in the Hijaz where the conservatism of the Najdis could
be evaded.'8 Acceptance of education for girls took even longer, with
the first government school opening in 1960. The only way the state was
able to "go public" with such schools was through granting the ulama
14 A well-known jurist, shaykh Abdallah ibn Humaid, issued a fatwa holding that
television was a prohibited innovation.
15 For a perspective on this episode, see HRH GENERAL KHALED BIN SULTAN, DESERT
WARRIOR 106-07(1995).
16 The acceptability of TV (but not necessarily all its content) seems to be beyond
dispute now with the appearance of the new grand mufti on Saudi TV on a regular basis
during the holy month of Ramadan in 1999.
17 The late grand mufti, Abd al-Aziz ibn Bas has his own website at
http://www.binbaz.org.sa.
18 A case in point is my father's village which steadfastly refused to accept a boys'
school until 1974 and a girls' until 1980.
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essentially total control over the education of girls, both in
administration and substance. Thus a special Presidency for the
Education of Girls was created, separate from the Ministry of Education
whose bureaucrats the ulama apparently could not trust with the well-
being and morals of girls. Indeed, the introduction of modem education
for girls, compromises and all, proved to be very traumatic for the
country. When the late King Faysal (d. 1975) introduced these schools
to the Al Qasim region, a true conservative bastion, he had to employ
force to keep them open.
Actually, nothing arouses the passions of the Saudis, ulama and
laity alike, so much as the issue of women. While a comprehensive
treatment is beyond the scope of this paper (and perhaps beyond the
competence of the writer), a quick glance may demonstrate the
extraordinary power and grip of the ulama. As many may know, Saudi
women are not allowed to drive. During the Gulf War, a number of
women decided to dramatize their plight by driving through Riyadh,
creating a tremendous backlash against the demonstrators personally and
against their cause in general. As a result, what was taken to be a social
convention was elevated to the status of law, with the government
seeking to appease the ulama by accepting their fatwas against driving
and proclaiming it the law of the land. Even when the interest of the
government appears to be clearly to allow driving, as the presence of the
hundreds of thousands of foreign drivers has proved to be a drain on the
economy, the government simply felt unable to confront the ulama and
their supporters. This goes beyond driving, as the government, for
example, is still unable to require women to provide photos for any
purpose, except passports, the possession of which is not compulsory.
In the sphere of law, the ulama still maintain a powerful grip on
both the process of law making and on the judiciary as well as training
in the law colleges. Because of the impermissibility of promulgating
laws that are not in conformity with the Shari'ah, the state has been
engaged in a long battle with the ulama over both content of the laws
and legal procedure. As recently as 1990, the government sought to
enact a law of procedure to govern proceedings before the shari'ah court
system.' 9 Even after it was fully vetted by several senior ulama, and
following proclamation and publication of the requisite royal decree
(thereby committing the king's prestige to the enterprise), the whole law
had to be abrogated within weeks as a result of widespread objections
among the ulama, especially the judges. To this day no codified law of
procedure exists in the shari'ah courts.
19 One of the most frustrating aspects of litigating before shari'ah judges is the
almost total lack of procedural rules. Although rudimentary notions exist, there is
nothing the litigant can use as a guide as to how a case might proceed, for each judge
seems to have his own rules to which the protagonists must adhere.
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Nor is resistance to codified procedure the only triumph enjoyed by
the ulama. While the Saudi state is unequivocally committed to the
implementation of Islamic law, there are legitimate arguments on how
such implementation may take place. Saudi judges are instructed to use
six standard (medieval) canonical texts in which majority and minority
views are considered all valid. Judges are free to choose among these
views, with the result that some rulings over identical disputes may
diverge. Some suggest that the best way to overcome what may be
unfair results (and lack of predictability in outcomes) is to codify these
rulings by choosing a particular view and requiring all judges to apply
it.2° The judges and ulama in general object to this step, reasoning that
both majority and minority views are legitimate and the legal reasoning
of the judge (his ijtihad) is the only acceptable way to remove the
conflict between the two views - and not the views of bureaucratic
codifiers. 2
1
Largely because of the recalcitrance of the ulama and the shari'ah
judges with respect to laws and procedure, the state was slowly forced to
create parallel judicial tribunals.22 These "alternatives" do not challenge
the principle that the shariah courts are the courts of general jurisdiction
but exploits shariah rules that allow the ruler to vest particular
jurisdiction in a particular court or judge. Over the years, special
tribunals proliferated, ranging from those dealing with labor disputes,
customs violations (e.g., smuggling) to negotiable instruments, forgery,
banking and others. The most significant parallel institution, however, is
the Board of Grievances. It was originally conceived to avail the state of
a tribunal where it could be sued, the notion taken over from some well-
known historical experience of Muslim rulers. Slowly, as the
government saw it was unable to impose the applications of what it
considers legitimate laws on the shariah judges,2 it shifted jurisdiction
over specific disputes (and laws) to this Board. A significant broadening
20 It is not fully accurate to say there is no codification of the shari'ah in Saudi
Arabia. While the question of modem-style codification was debated by senior ulama
and a majority rejected it, certain parts of the judiciary rules explicity rank the canonical
texts where the judge is obligated to follow a certain view over the alternative.
21 Indeed, in both the shari'ah courts and the Board of Grievances, when the court of
appeal reverses a judgment on substantive (and not procedural) grounds, the case is
remanded to a different judge (or panel of judges) as the original judge may not be
forced to change his views.
22 Those familiar with the late period of the Ottoman empire may find this experience
all too familiar.
23 Another interesting method the government employs to impose laws that the
shari'ah judges reject is to use the judges to convict, but not sentence, those indicted
with a certain crime (e.g., drug use, where the statutory punishment would actually be
imposed by the Ministry of Interior.)
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of the Board's jurisdiction took place in 1988 when commercial disputes
were transferred from the old commercial tribunal at the Ministry of
Commerce and vested in the Board. The Board judges are essentially
trained in the same fashion as those of the shariah Courts. However,
those who choose to serve on the Board are jurists who do not find
codified laws and procedure to be objectionable, so long as they are not
inconsistent with Islamic law. Laws applied by the Board tend to be
clearer and its court of appeal generally adheres to precedents, which
lawyers and litigants find helpful. Procedure has also been evolving,
with a fully codified law dealing with administrative disputes in place
which also informally serves as a guide for commercial claims.
Nonetheless, the judges here are just as "pure" in their interpretation of
the laws as any shariah judge. Although empowered to enforce foreign
judgments and arbitral awards, we still are unaware of a single such
enforcement, for a truly Muslim polity would not apply any law but that
of the shariah and the enforcement of judgments based on man-made
laws are considered anathema. This attitude suffuses the whole system
such as the (almost total) refusal to acknowledge choice of law
provisions. Furthermore, the Board would steadfastly uphold the strict
interpretation of prohibition against banking interest, and the state was
thus forced to create yet another tribunal to settle banking disputes (still
not upholding interest but at least declining to re-characterize already
paid interest as repayment of principal).
Banking indeed is one field where tension between the needs of a
modem state (and economy) and the old laws is clearly demonstrated as
seen in the preceding paragraph and as shown by the role of the notary
public. Unlike many other countries, the function, role, and training of
the notary public is highly specialized, for he must be a fully trained
shariah graduate; he is also a salaried employee of the Ministry of
Justice. Many transactions are documented through the notary public,
including mortgages. As a shariah graduate, the notary public finds it
objectionable to register mortgages in the name of banks, and so far the
government has been unable to force them to do so. Likewise, as the
authority entrusted with notarizing new companies and (formerly and
still practically) any amendments to their articles of association, the
notary public controls what objects the company may perform (videos,
satellite dishes, banking and other "prohibited" activities are routinely
declined as well as dating by the Gregorian calendar). The Ministry of
Commerce has had to resort to creative ways to overcome these
difficulties.
These tensions characterizing the relationship between the ulama
(judges and scholars alike) and the state should be qualified for the old
symbiosis between the ulama and the prince is still intact. Once the
anomaly of the "revolutionary" Sunni ulama was tamed with the
foundation of the Saudi state, the ulama reverted to their historically
[Vol.32:307
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well-practiced quietism. The Sunni creed dictates that no matter how the
prince behaves, his subjects must remain obedient and no armed
rebellion is sanctioned, thus assuring the state of the ulama's loyalty
even if they object to specific acts. Furthermore, the ulama still provide
the indispensable ideological props for the state. To this end, the Saudis
created the "Council of the Senior Ulama" in which is vested the
function of promulgating fatwas dealing with new issues (e.g. drug
smuggling, liability for livestock losses on express highways, etc.) as
well as providing "politically" needed fatwas. The Council has a good
track record of upholding the old partnership and providing appropriate
rulings when summoned by the government. During the attack on the
Mecca Mosque in 1979, the Council did not hesitate to issue edicts
allowing the government forces to fight the rebels in the Holy Mosque.24
Indeed, even Saudi "dissent," limited as it is, has to be wrapped in
the mantle of religion and only dissenting ulama would attract any
serious following.2 Interestingly enough, some of the dissidents were
also licensed as lawyers, as were some of the members of the (now-
dissolved) Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights,26 whose
licenses were revoked in a governmental crackdown on dissent a few
years ago. But such lawyers are more the exception than the rule, and
most are involved with the more mundane aspects of legal practice.
Although there is now a recognizable group practicing law in Saudi
Arabia, nowhere is the equivalent Arabic word of lawyer, muhami, to be
found in any relevant law. For historically, the function did not exist and
only the limited notion of attorney-in-fact was known, in which a party
would appoint (or perhaps hire) another party to pursue its claims in its
stead before the court. Even such a limited practice did not extend to the
field of criminal law, as defendants were simply expected to present
their defense and the judge was entrusted with correctly upholding the
law.27 In the recent notorious case of the two English nurses in Saudi
24 For more details of the Mecca incident in 1979 and the role of the ulama see
generally Joseph A. Kechichian, The Role of the Ulama in the Politics of an Islamic
State: The Case of Saudi Arabia, 18 INT'L J. MIDDLE EAST STUD. 53 (1986).
2 Dissent in Saudi Arabia has historically been parochial (tribal, regional, sectarian,
etc.), and only recently has dissent gained a national character (the pan-Arabist dissent of
the 1960s, while national in terms of leadership, basically was of no consequence as it
had little if any following).
26 This was a group "reportedly formed to monitor the Saudi regime's human rights'
violations and report charges of government corruption." See Mamoun Fandy, Serious
Threats to Saudi Arabia's Stability, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 16, 1996, available in
LEXIS, News Library.
27 Impressionistically, it seems that most criminal convictions are based on
confessions. But because of the judges' distrust of the police, their claim and even
presentation of a signed confession would not be accepted. For a confession to be
admissible, the suspect had to be hauled before a judge and declare that he actually
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Arabia who murdered a third, the parties were represented by counsel
largely in deference to the international scrutiny the case attracted.
28
From this limited notion, a profession is slowly emerging. 29 But
like other spheres, tension between tradition and modernity pervades the
field. For the graduate of Shariah colleges, the shari'ah courts would
grant licenses called "license to accept appointment as attorney-in-fact,"
to avoid the designation of a lawyer. For those who have graduated from
the non-shari'ah law colleges, whether in Saudi Arabia or abroad, the
Ministry of Commerce issues licenses designating the holder as "legal
advisor." Whereas the shariah license is heavily weighed towards
character 3° (after satisfaction of receipt of degree or providing evidence
of equivalent knowledge), the Ministry of Commerce only takes the
length of academic schooling and actual training into account. In all,
there is no law governing the profession, no unified criteria for granting
licenses, with the result that there is now an explosion of licenses of
highly divergent standards.
Because of the extraordinary diversity of background in education
and training, Saudi lawyers probably have little in common except the
contempt with which the profession is viewed, especially by shari'ah
judges. On the bright side, as the economy grows in sophistication, more
and more legal services are being required and a grudging acceptance (if
not respect) is slowly gaining hold. No such thing is happ ening in
criminal law as both government interest and Islamic edicts seem to
ensure a hostile attitude toward such acceptance.
Even that attitude may not hold for long, as the mounting pressure
of modernity and international scrutiny is forcing through some reforms.
In recent years, the government has sought to re-organize the "public
prosecutor" functions. Whereas in the past it was handled haphazardly,
with the government represented by all kinds of bureaucrats, including
policemen or even the judge himself, a new agency for investigations
confessed and the confession would be attested appropriately, to be submitted later in the
trial, which would not necessarily be before the same judge.
28 See Russell Jenkins & Michael Binyon, Family Pleads For Nurse Accused Over
Murder, TIMES (London), Dec. 28, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library; SA:
Leading QC to Represent Gilford Family, AAP Newsfeed, Aug. 29, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library.
29 Indeed, recently the government has granted a group of lawyers a license to publish
a monthly magazine devoted to lawyers, Al Muhami.
30 One of the criteria used by some judges is to request the applicant to submit a
certificate from his local mosque that he regularly attended early morning (fajr) prayers.
31 There are fatwas from time immemorial clearly stating that an attorney may not
accept appointment if he knows the position of his client to be clearly wrong. In addition,
Islamic law does not automatically presume the innocence of the suspect, bringing his
character and previous convictions into the assessment.
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and public prosecution has been created.32 Its members are required to
have the same qualifications as the judges (even their pay scale was
originally linked to that of the judiciary) in addition to receiving training
in modem investigative techniques and prosecutorial methods. This
agency is slowly taking over the functions of the police in interrogation
and prosecuting cases on behalf of the state. Interestingly, a recent draft
of its bylaws mentions the right of the accused to have an attorney-in-
fact and to have the latter present during interrogations. Whether it
survives in the final draft remains to be seen.
The demands of modernity are most striking in the government's
attitude towards legal education in non-Muslim countries. In a system
where only the Shari'ah is considered valid and all man-made laws
categorically rejected, one would expect the study of law in the west to
be forbidden or at least ignored. The reality is more mixed. For even
when the government seriously cut back on scholarships for students
abroad, law, along with medicine, were the exceptions. Indeed, for some
time now, many western-trained lawyers have occupied very high
positions in the bureaucracy of the state, and currently two are members
of the Council of Ministers. In addition, much of the drafting of
regulations is normally entrusted to the Legal Advisors Department of
the Council of Ministers, most of whose staff are trained, at least in part,
in the west.
Finally, the "renowned" Committee for the Command of Virtue and
Prevention of Vice, the morality police in short, is a peculiar Saudi
agency that is quite controversial, especially with the expatriate
communities. An institution that is theoretically the embodiment of that
venerable Islamic principle, the Committee is empowered to ensure that
people, merchants, foreigners and all conform to Islamic edicts in dress,
worship and conduct. Its powers tend to fluctuate, with the government
occasionally granting them more latitude and at others restricting their
freedom to act, but never totally stopping their activities. Although set
up and paid for by the government, volunteers are allowed to join its
activities and many embarrassing incidents are routinely reported by the
foreign press. During the Gulf war, the activities of those vigilante were
excessive where citizens and foreigners alike were sometimes
gratuitously harassed, leading to an eventual government crackdown on
these groups after the departure of foreign troops from Saudi Arabia.
The above should, it is hoped, give a flavor of the type and power
of the legal actors in Saudi Arabia. It is by no means an exhaustive list
and some actors are not dealt with; nonetheless, the major actors have
been identified along with their roles.
32 This agency is called the Commission for Investigation and Public Prosecution.
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